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CAN NRA BE MADE CONSTITUTIONAL?
By FRAZER ARNOLD, EsQ., of the Denver Bar.
HE poultry decision handed down recently has caused
much comment. The dispatches from Washington are
now full of conjectures by various persons upon how the
codes and the act can be revamped "to meet the objections of
the Supreme Court" and still survive. In my opinion all such
conjectures are vain and useless. The act and the codes are
impossible. They are incapable of cure. No mere technicali-
ties are available; no devices floating in the air for a "smart"
luminary to discover, in order to "satisfy" a court. Whatever
the fond hopes or noble motives may have been that inspired
the act and codes, they were a lethal rapier-thrust at the heart
of our constitutional liberty and government. All that a
despotism or a dictatorship is, is a form of government where
the three elements are so fused, or confused, in one person
or department that the executive is also in effect the legislature.
with a judiciary that does not function as a check upon the
despot's actions. Where that condition develops, there is
regardless of names, an end of liberty both in business and per-
sonal affairs, an end of constitutional government, with its
indispensable checks and balances.
The doom of the codes was in reality spelled by the
Supreme Court, not in the poultry case, but in the oil decision
of last January. It was not necessary to wait for the Belcher
lumber code case from Alabama, or for this poultry case from
Brooklyn which the government imagined was "stronger," in
order to foresee the fate of the entire NRA plan. In the oil
case, Congress undertook (by Section 9-c) to leave it to the
President to say whether it should be legal or illegal for
private interests to transport oil in interstate commerce above
certain quotas, that is, undertook to delegate to the executive
the right to legislate on that subject. And the Supreme Court
knocked that out, as an illegal abrogation by Congress of
its function and duty. Applying this principle to the codes,
what did one find? No code was ever enacted by Congress.
Each code was framed by volunteers in the particular trade or
industry who had formed a "group," and was then submitted
by this group, not to Congress, but to the executive. The
executive then decided whether or not he would approve, i. e.,
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enact it. If he approved it, then the bill had passed the Presi-
dent, and was supposed to have all the effect of a federal
statute that had successfully run the gamut first of approval
by a committee of Congress and then of adoption on the floor
by both houses of that legislative body. Under the act, the
President also was supposed to have power to adopt codes sua
sponte if he thought particular industries needed them. All
this was executive legislation with a vengeance: whole indus-
tries and lines of business put under the most minute and rigid
hamstringing and regulation, in an infinite variety of details,
by presidential ukase. The codes were simply statutes, pre-
scribing a multitude of rules, large and small; and they were
enacted by the President. Congress had nothing to do with
them, except to say to the President that he might proceed and
pass those statutes himself, or not, as he saw fit.
Having decided the oil case as it had, what possible
chance was there for the Supreme Court to uphold the codes?
Obviously none. The codes were the reductio ad absurdum
of the whole vogue and practice of allowing executive officials
to legislate under some general grant of power. That the
codes presented a more obvious case than the oil statute is
shown by the fact that one justice dissented in the oil case, but
even he turned thumbs down against the codes. No court
decision was really necessary. The codes and the act clearly
flouted the very first section of the first article of our written
constitution. Time has been wasted in many courts over the
question whether a given activity was interstate or intra-
state or whether it affected interstate commerce, upon the tacit
though erroneous assumption that Congress can play as it
likes with the rights and interests of any business embarked in
interstate activity-whereas the basic question was whether
there existed the ineradicable vice of a delegation of legislative
authority. If so, it was immaterial whether the commerce was
interstate, as in the oil case, or intrastate as in the poultry
decision.
Now, the essence of the entire NRA conception is this
illegal delegation of power. An NRA without it would be
emptier than Hamlet with the-Immortal Dane left out. As-
suming that the particulars of a code would be valid as legis-
lation, it could only be adopted by Congress itself, and Con-
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gress could labor from now until doomsday without agree-
ing upon a small traction of the 600 codes that were adopted
under the late scheme. Congress will never attempt it, and
if it did, its committee hearings alone would be endless.
But this, in my opinion, is the smallest part of the objec-
tion to any more or further codes.
No doubt one may eliminate from a legal discussion any
proposed system of "voluntary codes." In a country like ours,
on the grand scale, they would never work, and would per-
haps make endless difficulties in the way of monopoly. There
remains only the suggestion that codes affecting interstate
commerce, duly enacted by Congress itself, not by the Presi-
dent, and limited to a few large industries, would be valid and
practicable. The answer to that suggestion is that the staple
ingredient of the late codes has been a mass of regulation, e. g.,
of wages, hours, trade practices, policies and details, with
which Congress has no more right to meddle, under the guise
or pretended authority of the commerce clause, than a state
legislature has authority to meddle with such prerogatives of
the citizen under the guise or masquerade of the police power.
By way of summary, it seems that any attempt to pump
vitality into the code concept is bound to fail, because that
concept is impossible of existence under a constitutional sys-
tem of the division of powers. The code concept was an
exotic, an imported article. It might do in a "corporative
state" like the present-day Italy, or in any other despotism,
where one person or group absorbs all executive and legisla-
tive power, with the judiciary existing only to relieve the
dictator of the troublesome details of administering justice. It
can never do in a country like ours, where we understand
something of how to insure a reasonable freedom of action,
and where we still have a constitution, with plenty of vitality,
as shown by the unanimous decision of yesterday.
NEW BOOKS
Mr. F. D. Stackhouse asks that our readers be advised
that the Law Library of the District Court has just received
Revised Edition, in two (2) Volumes, by Charles Warren,
"The Supreme Court in United States History."
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